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Surveys provide widely cited measures of political knowledge. Do unusual aspects of survey 
interviews affect these measures? An experiment on a nationally representative sample of over 
1200 Americans provides an answer. Respondents are randomly assigned to one of four groups. 
A control group answers questions in a typical survey context. Respondents in three treatment 
groups are given a longer window of time in which to answer questions, a small monetary 
incentive for answering questions correctly, or both. These variations increase performance 
significantly for almost every knowledge question we asked. Overall, average knowledge scores 
in the treatment groups are 11-24 percent higher than in the control group. The treatments also 
cause significant reductions in the magnitude of respondents￿ errors on open-ended questions. 
The findings imply that new elicitation strategies can improve our understanding of what citizens 
know about politics and other socially relevant phenomena. 
  2A basic premise of democratic governance is that citizens know certain things about 
politics. For this reason, scholars and other political observers devote considerable energy to the 
study of political knowledge, relying mostly on large surveys for evidence. These data have 
yielded two conclusions. First, many citizens do badly at answering political knowledge 
questions (e.g., Converse 1964, Kinder and Sears 1985, Bennett 1995). Second, most analysts 
see such performances as a problem for democratic governance. The public￿s inability to answer 
survey-based political knowledge questions is often interpreted as evidence that citizens￿ abilities 
at key democratic moments, such as elections, are far less than they could be. 
While it may seem reasonable to draw conclusions about a person￿s ability from such 
responses, in other contexts this kind of inference can backfire. To see how, consider a simple 
example: ￿Professor, what percentage of the vote did John Kerry actually receive in Kansas?￿ 
Such questions from an eager undergraduate can strike fear into the heart of many lecturers. Few 
political scientists can answer such questions when they are asked without warning. While many 
scholars know where and how to find the answers, and would do so quickly if given an 
opportunity, the normal pace of a classroom lecture usually precludes halting the interaction to 
consult trusted references. In such cases, mumbling something about ￿a book on my shelf￿ or ￿a 
website that has the answer￿ is the best one can do from the lectern. While most people would 
consider it unfair for students to base broad judgments of a professor￿s competence on his or her 
immediate responses in such circumstances, common evaluations of citizens￿ abilities rest on just 
this kind of inference. 
The most widely-used measures of political knowledge come from respondents￿ answers 
to survey questions. Some survey firms give respondents advance warning (e.g., a letter in the 
mail) that they will be contacted. Many other firms give no such notice. Of those respondents who receive advance notice, few￿if any￿are given detailed information about the content of 
the survey. And few, if any, are told that the survey will include questions about factual aspects 
of politics. Survey-based political knowledge questions catch respondents by surprise.  
In many cases where citizens make important political decisions, such as whether to turn 
out for a particular election or choose which candidate to vote for, circumstances are different. 
The need to make such decisions does not appear ￿out of the blue.￿ Election dates, for example, 
are usually knowable for months or even years in advance. In such contexts, citizens are much 
more likely to have advance warning of a need to access particular political information than do 
respondents in political surveys.  
Moreover, the pace of a survey interview prevents respondents from behaving as at least 
some of them would before key political moments. In such cases, citizens can read newspapers, 
visit websites, or consult with friends about important political topics. While not all citizens avail 
themselves of such opportunities, at least the opportunities are there to be had. The typical 
survey interview does not facilitate such opportunities. Their pace is established in part by 
conversational norms (Schwarz 1996, Chapter 5) and in part by the incentives of the interviewer 
(Kenickell 2000, 2003) and the respondent (Krosnick and Alwin 1987, Blair and Burton 1987). 
Such dynamics can lead respondents to satisfice￿to offer answers without thinking hard about 
them￿and they can induce interviewers to keep the interview moving as respondent 
participation is difficult to maintain in telephone interviews that go on for too long. This context 
does not give respondents opportunities to check the same kinds of references that at least some 
would use if they knew that a key democratic moment were approaching. 
 Differences between common attributes of the survey context and attributes of the contexts 
in which people make important political decisions matter because opportunity and motivation 
  2should affect respondents￿ abilities to answer political knowledge questions (Luskin 1987, Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1996). The difference between what we might say readily during an 
unexpected and fast-paced survey interview and the knowledge we need to accomplish a large 
range of less frequent tasks is why we keep books on our shelves, the phone numbers of trusted 
friends in an easily accessible place, and computers on our desks. Knowing where to find these 
references expands the knowledge base upon which we base important decisions. We use these 
resources to organize information for quick retrieval later on. Most political surveys offer neither 
the opportunity nor the motivation to consult such references.  
In this paper, we contend that the practice of drawing broad conclusions about citizens￿ 
abilities on the basis of conventional survey-based political knowledge measures is of limited 
value. If the rationale for devoting so much attention and energy to questions of political 
knowledge is to assess the extent to which citizens can make important decisions at key 
democratic moments, then our elicitation procedures should better match the conditions under 
which they make such decisions. In what follows, we explore how inferences about political 
knowledge change when new standards are used. Our analysis focuses on the following claim: 
Null hypothesis: Allowing extra time or providing a small monetary incentive for correctly 
answering knowledge questions during a survey interview will affect neither the likelihood 
of offering a correct answer nor the nature of incorrect responses. 
 
We use a 2x2 experimental design to test this hypothesis. Within a set of survey interviews, 
we give one randomly selected half of our sample only one minute to answer each question, 
whereas the other half has a broader time window￿up to 24 hours￿to respond. Independently, 
we offer one randomly selected half of our sample a small monetary reward ($1) for each correct 
answer. Each respondent is thus equally likely to be in one of four conditions: one minute no 
pay; one minute with pay, 24 hours no pay, 24 hours with pay. These variations are important 
  3because the standard way of measuring political knowledge is to place all respondents in the 
￿one minute no pay￿ context.
1 In such surveys, the extent to which answers to knowledge 
questions are a result of inhibitory attributes of common survey contexts cannot be evaluated. 
As a result, the null hypothesis is far from trivial￿it is a foundation of the existing 
literature. Survey-based claims about political knowledge presume that observed responses are 
robust to alterations in the survey context. Conclusions that poor performance on surveys reflects 
how citizens will act at key democratic moments presume that the responses are the same in the 
surveys as they would be at the key moments. Our work reveals that the presumptions do not 
hold when the survey context is altered. It also provides a constructive alternative for better 
conceptualizing and measuring political knowledge. 
We conclude that current measures of political knowledge do not capture adequately what 
people know when it matters most from a democratic perspective. We reject the null hypothesis 
not only for the sum of correct answers to all the knowledge questions we asked but also for 
almost every single question when analyzed individually. On average, extra time and a small 
monetary incentive lead to a 24 percent increase in the number of questions answered correctly. 
Simply offering people extra time or a little money for getting the right answer does not 
transform them into political encyclopedias, but it does significantly affect how they answer 
these questions. 
The paper continues as follows. Next, we motivate and explain the experimental design in 
greater detail. Then, we describe the survey in which the experiment was included. We then 
present our results, focusing first on how experimental variations affect responses to individual 
questions and then on how the variations affect the number of questions answered correctly. In 
                                                 
1 Some survey organizations offer respondents compensation, but it is a reward for completing the survey, 
not for response quality. 
  4brief discussion and conclusion sections, we spell out further implications for common 
interpretations of existing political knowledge data and offer ideas for further research. 
Political Knowledge under Realistic Conditions: Experimental Design and Implementation 
To measure political knowledge in surveys, researchers typically use a set of factual 
questions about politics. When asked to quickly recall a fact, respondents will first draw upon the 
kind of memory known as ￿declarative memory.￿  Existing approaches presume that simply 
asking a political knowledge question will induce respondents to exert sufficient effort to 
retrieving all relevant facts. Declarative memory, however, does not work in such a fashion. 
There is a correspondence between the amount of effort one devotes towards recalling facts and 
the range of facts recalled (National Research Council 1994: 28-29, Kandel, et. al. 1995: 656-
664). With minimal effort, a relatively small set of facts from declarative memory will emerge. 
With greater effort, more facts tend to emerge. One possible limitation of existing political 
knowledge measures is that they are based on a more limited draw from declarative memory than 
occurs at key political moments.  
A second limitation exists. Cognitive psychologists distinguish fact-based declarative 
memory from rule-based ￿procedural memory.￿ Knowing where and how to find things, such as 
Kerry￿s vote share in Kansas, is an important form of procedural memory. Procedural memory 
￿accumulates slowly through repetition over many trials, is expressed primarily by improved 
performance, and cannot ordinarily be expressed in words￿ (Kandel, et. al. 1995:658).
2 To figure 
out which candidate we prefer, or how we feel about a new policy proposal, many of us draw on 
procedural memories of how to gather information that might help us in our decision. The pace 
                                                 
2 Many scholars (see, e.g., the review in National Research Council 2000) use the terms ￿declarative￿ and 
￿procedural￿ to distinguish the two kinds of memory. Kandel, et. al, (1995:656) refer to declarative 
memory as ￿explicit￿ memory and to procedural memory as ￿implicit memory.￿  
  5and incentives that characterize typical survey procedures, in contrast, may inhibit respondents 
from using such procedural memories.  
Typical surveys do not provide a context conducive to documenting the kinds of 
declarative and procedural knowledge that are relevant to many normatively-driven questions 
about what citizens know at important democratic moments. To create a survey context that 
more closely resembles the circumstances of such moments, we experimentally manipulate two 
elements of the survey interview, the time respondents have to complete a set of political and 
economic knowledge questions and whether or not they earn money for answering these 
questions correctly. In so doing, our design integrates elements from leading nationally-
representative political surveys, survey experiments, and experimental economics. Figure 1 
provides a schematic representation of our design.  
 [Figure 1 about here.] 
The first experimental factor is time. The pace of a typical survey interview prompts 
respondents to answer questions quickly. To determine the extent to which this attribute affects 
political knowledge scores, we gave one randomly selected half of our sample only one minute 
to answer each knowledge question. We gave the other half a broader window￿up to 24 
hours￿to respond. In our Internet-based survey, which respondents completed using a computer 
or a WebTV unit, the knowledge questions appeared after an initial battery that solicited party 
identification, interest in politics, and previous turnout. After this battery, all respondents saw a 
common introduction: 
In the next part of this study, you will be asked 14 questions about politics, public policy, and 
economics. Many people don’t know the answers to these questions, but it is helpful for us if 
you answer, even if you’re not sure what the correct answer is. We encourage you to take a 
guess on every question. At the end of this study, you will see a summary of how many 
questions you answered correctly. 
Respondents in the ￿one minute￿ condition were informed that 
  6You will have 1 minute to answer each question. After 1 minute, you will be automatically 
forwarded to the next question. If you finish answering a question before 1 minute is up, you 
may proceed to the next question by clicking on the ￿Next Question￿ button. 
Each of the knowledge questions was programmed to be on screen for up to one minute. If 
respondents answered the question within that period or if one minute had expired, the screen 
changed to show the next question. In the ￿one minute￿ condition, respondents could not go back 
to a previous knowledge question after they had moved past it in the interview. 
Respondents in the ￿24 hour￿ condition were informed that 
You will have 24 hours to answer these questions from the time you see the first question. 
Once the 24 hours are up or whenever you decide that you are done, you will be forwarded to 
the next section and will not be able to return to the knowledge questions. However, before 
you reach the next section, you may go back to previous knowledge questions by clicking the 
￿back￿ button. 
Starting from the moment at which respondents saw the first knowledge question, they had 
24 hours to complete the knowledge series. During this period, they could go back and forth 
between knowledge questions (but not to the initial questions about interest, turnout, and 
partisanship), change their answers, and interrupt and resume the survey as often as they liked. 
When respondents reached the end of the knowledge sequence, a screen informed them that they 
could modify their answers until their 24 hours were up or move to next part of the survey (at 
which point they could not return to the knowledge questions.) 
The second experimental factor is a monetary reward. To encourage respondents to base 
their answers on a more extensive search of declarative memory or to draw on relevant aspects of 
procedural memory, we include in our experimental design an incentive for greater respondent 
effort. Following a well-established practice in experimental economics, we chose a monetary 
incentive because  
￿The presence and amount of financial incentive does seem to affect average 
performance in many tasks, particularly judgment tasks where effort responds to 
incentives￿and where increased effort improves performance. Prototypical tasks of this 
  7sort are memory or recall tasks (in which paying attention helps)￿which are so mundane 
that monetary reward induces persistent diligence when intrinsic motivation wanes.￿ 
(Camerer and Hogarth 1999:8). 
 
We offered one randomly selected half of our sample a monetary reward, one dollar, for 
each correct answer.
3 After receiving the timing information (according to their random 
assignment on the first factor), respondents in the pay conditions received the following 
instructions: 
In addition, we will pay you for answering questions correctly. You will earn 1,000 bonus 
points ($1) for every correct answer you give. So, if you answer 3 of the 14 questions 
correctly, you will earn 3,000 bonus points ($3). If you answer 7 of the 14 questions 
correctly, you will earn 7,000 bonus points ($7). The more questions you answer correctly, 
the more you will earn. 
The dependent variables in our study come from answers to the 14 knowledge questions that 
we asked. For open-ended answers, we specified a range of answers we considered close enough 
to count as correct. Respondents were told the number of questions they answered correctly (and 
the rewards they had earned) at the very end of the interview. This sequence is necessary because 
we asked some post-treatment questions about the election and wanted to avoid confounding 
answers to these questions by offering explicit performance feedback.
4 Respondents received 
                                                 
3 We chose $1 per question (which amounts to a maximum possible payoff of $14) because we assumed 
that the amount would be non-trivial for most respondents and because this amount allowed us to stay 
within our budget while generating a sufficient number of cases per cell for rigorous statistical 
evaluations. Following Gneezy and Rustichini (1999), we believed that rewards far smaller than $1 per 
correct answer would not be a sufficient incentive. While rewards greater than $1 per correct answer 
would likely generate greater treatment effects, they present two problems. First, at some point the 
incentive is unrealistically large for most respondents.  Second, given a fixed budget, higher payments 
would have forced us to approach a far fewer set of respondents per cell. While many successful 
experiments in psychology are administered with far fewer respondents per cell than our target (300 per 
cell) scholarly norms in political science often prompt a demonstration that treatment effects hold for 
important subgroups and are sustainable in multivariate analyses ￿ both of which we demonstrate later in 
the paper. With such expectations in mind, we opted for larger cell values and moderately sized 
payments. 
4 We provided the following explanation to respondents after they had answered the last knowledge 
question (and, in the ￿24 hour￿ condition, decided to move to the next part of the interview): ￿We are now 
calculating the number of questions you answered correctly and will show you how you did momentarily. 
  8credit for correct answers in the form of ￿bonus points.￿ The firm that conducted our study, 
Knowledge Networks, sends their panelists checks for $25 when they reach 25,000 points (which 
they can also earn in other surveys they take.) For all practical purposes, we consider our 
incentives direct cash rewards. The instructions in the pay condition mentioned the bonus points 
as well as their dollar equivalents. Respondents in the pay conditions were reminded on every 
screen with a knowledge question that a correct answer would earn them a specific monetary 
reward.
5 
The Survey 
Our 2x2 experiment was embedded in a representative survey of U.S. residents conducted 
by Knowledge Networks between October 19 and November 1, 2004. Knowledge Networks 
interviews national probability samples over the Internet by providing a large panel, selected 
through Random Digit Dialing, with WebTV units and/or free Internet connections in exchange 
for taking surveys. The participants for this study constitute a randomly selected subset of the 
KN panel and approximate a random sample of the U.S. adult population. Our survey was 
assigned to 1,550 panelists of whom 1,220 (79 percent) completed it. Eighty percent of the 
respondents who completed the survey did so within 4 days of the fielding date.
6 
                                                                                                                                                             
In the meantime, please answer a few simple questions that have no right or wrong answers. After you 
finish the next few questions, we will show you the results.￿ 
5 We conducted a manipulation check to determine if respondents actually spend more time answering the 
knowledge questions in the ￿24 hour￿ conditions. Not surprisingly, giving people 24 hours to complete 
the interview leads them to take more time. Monetary incentives also increase interview length. This 
effect kicks in even in the ￿one minute with pay￿ condition, but is stronger in the ￿24 hour￿ conditions. 
For details, see the appendix. Later in this paper, we also test for selection effects more explicitly by 
adding control variables to the analysis. 
6 We examined whether assignment to the experimental conditions affected completion rates (i.e., 
whether providing extra time for responses or paying respondents for correct answers would affect the 
likelihood that they complete the entire interview). If it does, then we must estimate this indirect effect of 
the experimental manipulations as well as their direct effects. Part of this complication is avoided because 
the assignment of the money factor occurred only when respondents reached the knowledge section of the 
interview. Respondents who quit the survey before that point could not have been affected by the 
monetary incentive as we had not revealed that aspect of the survey to them yet.  Only seventeen 
  9Knowledge Networks￿ survey methodology makes our study a conservative test of our 
hypothesis. The company informs its panelists by email when a new survey is waiting for them. 
They can then take the survey at a time of their own choosing. Hence, even respondents in our 
control group (￿one minute, no pay￿) are not literally caught during dinner or at other 
inopportune moments and asked to answer the knowledge questions on the spot. In fact, they 
even had the opportunity to pause the interview when they learned that they would be asked 
political knowledge questions. (However, they could not stop the relevant timers once they saw 
the first knowledge question.) Clearly, we do not capture the true inconvenience of a typical 
phone interview. Indirectly, panelists also receive credit for taking a survey because Knowledge 
Networks pays for their WebTV unit and/or an Internet connection to their PC. To be sure, this 
reward does not represent an incentive to answer thoughtfully, but the conditions in our control 
group do not recreate the conditions of a typical phone interview perfectly. Therefore, even 
respondents in the control group are more motivated and less inconvenienced than respondents in 
the telephone surveys from which many claims about political knowledge are derived. 
7 
                                                                                                                                                             
respondents quit after reaching that point in the interview. Ten were in the ￿24 hour￿ condition and may 
have forgotten to resume the interview with the 24-hour period. Assignment to the time condition was 
determined at the beginning of the interview but revealed to the respondents only at the beginning of the 
knowledge sequence. The completion rates in the two time conditions are not statistically different. 
Eighty percent of the respondents assigned to the ￿one minute￿ condition completed the interview, 
compared to 78 percent in the ￿24 hour￿ condition. Of the seventeen respondents who never made it to 
the knowledge questions, seven would have been assigned to the pay condition and ten to the no pay 
condition. Hence, selection effects are very unlikely. Therefore, we consider experimental differences 
between respondents who completed the interview as valid estimates of the true treatment effects.  
7 Survey data usually show learning over the course of a campaign. The percentage of respondents who 
answer the same knowledge questions correctly increases as the election approaches (eg. Johnston, 
Hagen, and Jamieson 2004). Because of this learning effect, the timing of our experiment might suppress 
the effect of our treatments. It was fielded two weeks before Election Day 2004 after a long campaign. If 
people do poorly on survey-based knowledge tests when there is no immediate real-world reason to know 
something about politics, then the marginal impact of extra time and monetary incentives would likely be 
greater if we had not conducted the study in the shadow of an impending election. 
The demonstration of learning effects using the standard survey procedure we criticize here raises another 
question. Is that result alone not enough to demonstrate that people acquire more information in advance 
of key democratic moments￿and that standard phone survey procedure can pick up this learning effect? 
  10The survey included 14 knowledge questions, some of them open-ended, others multiple 
choice. Seven were about political issues and seven were about economic issues. Our aim was to 
ask respondents about some of the most focal campaign issues of the 2004 presidential race as 
well as economic conditions that were relevant in that context. We asked about the candidates￿ 
positions on tax cuts, education, and the line-item veto. Our questions covered the Senate vote on 
the Iraq authorization and the 9/11 commission￿s findings about links between al-Qaeda and 
Iraq. We included questions about the composition of the Senate and the competitiveness of the 
presidential campaign in the respondent￿s state. Finally, we wanted to know if respondents could 
tell us how many Americans are not covered by health insurance, how many live in poverty, and 
how many are unemployed. We tested their knowledge of the estate tax and the federal debt. 
While we included two questions that we thought would be relatively easy for everyone to 
answer, we expected most to be difficult. We also included at least one question each about Bush 
(his proposal to increase funding for the striving readers initiative) and Kerry (his position on the 
line-item veto) for which the correct answer went against prevailing stereotypes of them. In 
short, we asked challenging questions about important issues facing voters in the 2004 election. 
A complete list of questions and their wording is in table 1. 
(Table 1 goes here) 
We followed Mondak and Davis￿s (2001) recommendation to discourage ￿Don￿t Know￿ 
responses by not giving respondents an explicit ￿Don￿t Know￿ option for each question. 
                                                                                                                                                             
We believe that standard survey methods fall short for two related reasons. First, this argument applies 
only political decisions with a fixed time horizon, such as elections or referenda. Yet people also form 
opinions about new issues, policy proposals, and politicians. Without the focal point of an impending 
election, it is hard to know when learning occurs and how much information underlies people￿s newly 
formed opinions. Second, even in an election context, we do not know when respondents reached their 
decision. On Election Day, some early deciders may already have forgotten some of the information that 
affected their decision. Knowledge in standard survey interviews close to Election Day will therefore 
underestimate what some respondents knew when they made up their minds (Lodge, Steenbergen, and 
Braun 1995). 
  11Respondents could of course hit the ￿next question￿ button without marking any answer, but 
their responses show that very few of them did (see below). Discouraging ￿Don￿t Know￿ 
responses reduces distortions because some people are more likely to guess than others in the 
absence of encouragement. More importantly, our interest in analyzing how variations in the 
survey context affect the nature and distribution of erroneous responses makes us very interested 
in how people guess. In other words, answers to open-ended (and some multiple-choice) 
knowledge questions tell us more than whether people get the answer right or wrong. We can 
also see if people￿s answers are off by a lot or a little. Believing that 15 percent of all Americans 
live in poverty may have different implications for people￿s decision-making than believing that 
35 percent do. For this reason, we start our analysis by looking at the experimental effects on the 
response distributions for individual questions. Later, we will use a summary knowledge 
measure for each respondent. For simplicity, our summary measure is the number of correct 
responses. This choice raises the question of how to determine the range of answers to open-
ended questions that we consider correct. These ranges are listed in table 1. We have also run the 
analyses with different ranges of the same general magnitude and the treatment effects remain 
similar.
8 
                                                 
8 A second coding decision pertains to respondents who did not see all of the knowledge questions. This 
situation arises in the ￿24 hour￿ conditions for respondents who reach the 24-hour time limit before 
completing the whole battery. In particular, some respondents in those conditions started the knowledge 
section, took a break, and never returned to complete the remaining questions. In our analysis of 
individual questions, we exclude respondents who never saw a particular question. Doing so in the 
calculation of the summary measures, however, would inflate the missing data problems and bias our 
sample because we would be excluding the less motivated respondents who forgot to finish the 
questionnaire. Hence, we use the total number of correct answers as our dependent variable and code all 
non-answered questions as incorrect. Only 24 of the respondents who started the knowledge section did 
not see all 14 knowledge questions, so this coding decision does not affect the substance of our findings. 
  12Findings 
For illustrative purposes, we begin this presentation by illustrating the experimental effects 
for two individual questions. We use these questions to highlight useful metrics for 
understanding what citizens do and do not know. Later, we provide analogous results for all of 
the questions we asked. 
One of our knowledge questions was about a proposal that John Kerry made in his 2004 
campaign. We asked about the family income level above which Kerry proposed to eliminate tax 
cuts that George W. Bush had signed into law. We offered respondents five answers: ￿Over 
$50,000 a year,￿ ￿over $100,000 a year,￿ ￿over $150,000 a year,￿ ￿over $200,000 a year,￿ and 
￿over $500,000 a year.￿ Figure 2 shows the responses to this question in the four experimental 
conditions.  
(Figure 2 goes here) 
The percentage of respondents who select the correct response (over $200,000 a year) rises 
from 41 percent in the control condition to 55 percent in the ￿24 hours with pay￿ condition. Our 
two treatments combined thus increases the proportion of respondents who answer the question 
correctly by 24 percent. Individually, the two treatments also improve performance. A logit 
analyses shows that each factors has an independent effect on political knowledge (time: β = .21, 
p = .08; pay: β = .36, p = .002; N=1197). The interaction of time and pay, on the other hand, is 
insignificant. In other words, the monetary incentive has the same effect regardless of whether 
respondents has one minute or up to 24 hours to answer the question and vice versa. 
Figure 2 shows a second effect of the experimental treatments that we can use to expand our 
understanding of what citizens do and do not know about politics. The treatments affect the 
  13nature of incorrect responses.
9 The percentage of respondents who believe or, perhaps, guess that 
Kerry wants to eliminate the Bush tax cut for all families with incomes over $50,000 per year 
drops from 19 percent in the control condition to between 10 and 13 percent in the three other 
conditions. A more thorough test of this dynamic comes from examining how the experimental 
design affects the magnitude of erroneous responses (i.e., deviations from the correct answer). 
This is a meaningful measure only when response options are ordered. We measure deviations 
from the correct answer by calculating the absolute difference between the correct answer and 
the response. For example, a respondent who selected ￿over $100,000 a year￿ deviates from the 
correct response by $100,000. The average absolute error is the mean deviation across 
respondents. (We multiply the measure by -1 so that higher values indicate greater proximity to 
the correct answer.)
10 
For the Kerry tax proposal, both time and pay reduce deviations from the correct answer by 
significant amounts. In the control group, the average absolute error was $72,000. In the ￿24 
hours with pay￿ condition, this error is only $52,000, a reduction of 27 percent. Time alone 
reduces the error by 10 percent, while a monetary incentive alone lowers it by 16 percent. The 
two independent main effects are significant at p < .05 (money) and p < .10 (time), while the 
interaction is not significant.  
                                                 
9 This kind of result parallels that of Smith and Walker (1993) who found that monetary incentives reduce 
the number of responses caused by subjects who could be characterized as thoughtless and unmotivated. 
10 Here, we define what deviation means for respondents who saw the question, but did not answer it. 
Even though few people did this in our experiment, omitting them would bias our results because 
respondents are least likely to provide an answer in the control condition. We deal with this problem by 
randomly assigning a response to all such respondents. Each response is equally likely to be assigned, so 
this procedure assumes that respondents would offer a completely random guess if they were forced to 
select a response, which seems reasonable for people who did not provide an answer even though they 
were invited to guess. (To reduce the impact of extreme random draws, we repeated each analysis 300 
times and report the average of those 300 calculations.) 
  14The usefulness of deviation from the correct answer as a measure of political knowledge is 
even more apparent for an important class of open-ended questions (i.e., questions where many 
different numerical-based responses are possible). Figure 3 plots responses to a question about 
the percentage of Americans that did not have health insurance in 2003 (for the complete text, 
see table 1.) If respondents entered a number outside the range of possible answers (in this 
example, a number less than 0 or greater than 100), an error message alerted them and gave them 
an opportunity to change their response. Otherwise, any response was recorded and the next 
question appeared. According to the Census Bureau, 15.6 percent of the population did not have 
health insurance in 2003.  
For analytic purposes, we treat answers within 6 points of the correct answer (9.6 to 21.6 
percent) as sufficiently close to be ￿correct.￿ By this definition, 13 percent of the respondents in 
the control condition offered the correct answer, compared to 24 percent in the ￿24 hours with 
pay.￿ A logit model yields significant main effects for both time (p < .01) and pay (p < .01) on 
the probability of a correct response. 
Turning to an examination of the kinds of errors respondents made, the distributions of 
responses in figure 3 illustrate that respondents vastly overestimated the percentage of uninsured 
Americans. However, the experimental treatments move the distribution closer to the correct 
answer. The average absolute deviation from the correct answer decreases from 26 percent in the 
control group to 22 percent when respondents are offered extra time and a monetary inventive, a 
14-percent reduction in average error magnitude. Regressing the absolute error on the 
experimental factors indicates a significant effect for time (p < .10), but not for money or the 
interaction term. 
(Figure 3 goes here) 
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by which we can measure what citizens do and do not know and the impact of the experimental 
variations on these measures, we now present comparable analyses for all knowledge questions 
in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 lists the percentage of correct responses for each question in each 
experimental condition. For most items, the percentage is lowest in the control condition and 
highest in the ￿24 hours with pay￿ condition. The right-hand side of table 2 provides significance 
tests for the effects of the two experimental factors based on logit models predicting correct 
responses. We list p-values for the time ￿ money interaction term when it is significant. When it 
is not, we reestimate the model with only the two main effects and report those p-values. 
(Table 2 goes here) 
The bottom row in table 2 lists the mean percentage of correct answers across all questions. 
On average, 33 percent of the respondents answered correctly in the control condition. Time and 
pay together raise this percentage to 41, a 25-percent increase in performance. 
Giving respondents more time improved their performance significantly for 10 of the 14 
questions. Monetary incentives alone had a significant impact on correct answers to four 
questions. For one question (about Bush￿s striving readers initiative), both factors were necessary 
to increase the proportion of correct responses by a significant amount. The interaction of the 
two factors was also significant for the estate tax question. In sum, time had a very consistent 
and statistically significant effect on respondents￿ ability to answer knowledge questions 
correctly. The impact of monetary incentives was also positive, and in some cases quite sizeable, 
but not as consistently significant.  
Table 3 shows the average absolute deviation from the correct answer in each condition for 
questions where an ordering of responses in terms of error magnitudes is feasible. The right half 
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deviation from the correct answer. The results largely confirm the impact of the experimental 
treatments seen in table 2. In all but one case, offering more time leads to a statistically 
significant reduction in error, while the monetary incentive￿s effect is significant for the two tax-
related questions. Across all questions in table 3, as seen in the table￿s bottom row, simply 
paying respondents for correct answers, without increasing the amount of time respondents had 
to answer questions, reduced the magnitude of their errors by an average of nearly 6 percent. 
Giving them more time to answer questions without paying them reduced errors by 
approximately 12 percent on average. Combining the two treatments lowered errors by an 
average of 14 percent.  
(Table 3 goes here) 
The only question for which we do not find any experimental effects in either table pertains 
to the 9/11 Commission￿s findings about the link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. The percentage of 
respondents who correctly said that the report found evidence that ￿a few al-Qaeda individuals 
visited Iraq or had contact with Iraqi officials￿ was unaffected by the experimental treatments. 
The experimental treatment does, however, affect the response distribution. The percentage of 
respondents who answered that there was no connection at all between Iraq and al-Qaeda 
increased from 26 percent in the control condition to 37 percent in the ￿24 hours with pay￿ 
condition. Both time and money were individually sufficient to lower the likelihood of the 
incorrect response that ￿Iraq was directly involved in carrying out the September 11th attacks.￿ 
Even with additional time and monetary incentives, it is clear that some respondents failed to 
note the subtleties of the commission￿s findings (i.e., respondents were less likely to choose a 
response option that indicated deep involvement but appeared to confound a claim of ￿no 
  17involvement￿ with the true claim of ￿limited involvement￿). We think that valuable future 
analysis on this topic could focus on how various media outlets covered the Iraq-al-Qaeda 
connection and whether such coverage fed the confusion. 
Examining each question individually offers a detailed impression of the experimental 
results. We now examine the impact of the experimental treatments on a respondent￿s total 
number of correct answers. Figure 4 plots the distribution of that variable in the control and the 
￿24 hours with pay￿ conditions. Adding time and money shift the distribution to the right 
bringing it to resemble a normal distribution (which is noteworthy given that we purposely chose 
questions that are much harder than standard political knowledge questions). 
(Figure 4 and Table 4 go here) 
Table 4 summarizes the distributions in all four experimental conditions. The experimental 
treatments reduce by nearly half the share of respondents who gets only one or two questions 
right and nearly doubles the share who answers eight or more questions correctly. Overall, by 
offering respondents time and a monetary incentive, we raised their average performance by 24 
percent. Analysis of variance confirms that both experimental factors significantly increase 
knowledge scores (Time: F[1,1216] = 17.2, p < .0001; Pay: F[1,1216] = 5.5, p < .02). The 
interaction of the two factors, on the other hand is not significant (Time ￿ Money: F[1,1216] = 
.43, n.s.), indicating that each factor works independently. 
To clarify the substantive significance of this 24 percent increase in political knowledge 
scores, we compare it to the effect of other politically relevant variables. Table 5 presents two 
OLS models that regress our 15-point knowledge index on the experimental main effects with 
(column 2) and without (column 1) controls for common demographic and attitudinal predictors 
of political knowledge. A comparison of the two columns reveals that the effects of time and pay 
  18change only marginally when the non-experimental controls are added (which simply confirms 
that the experimental randomization worked.) 
(Table 5 goes here) 
Mirroring earlier results, the combined effect of the two experimental factors amounts to a 
performance increase of one correct question per respondent (1.09 questions in the regression 
without controls and 1.01 questions in the regression with controls). Compared to the impact of 
the control variables, themselves selected for previous success in predicting political knowledge 
scores, this is a sizable effect. It is almost twice the size of the gender gap in this study and about 
the equivalent of a two standard deviation gain in a respondent￿s income. When compared to 
even more widely cited predictors of political knowledge, the experimental effects are more 
impressive. Together, they amount to two thirds of the difference between the most and least 
interested respondents. (The omitted category in table 5 includes respondents who follow politics 
￿only now and then￿ or ￿hardly at all.￿) Similarly, the joint effect of time and pay is equivalent 
to three quarters of the difference between a college graduate and a respondent with only a high 
school education. In other words, for $1 per question, we observed a performance increase on par 
with the results of three years of tuition payments. 
In sum, there are differences between the political knowledge of the control group and the 
treatment groups that are statistically and substantively significant. They are sufficient to reject 
the null hypothesis that existing findings about political knowledge are robust to changes in the 
method of eliciting responses. While our treatments by no means suggest that citizens are 
encyclopedic in their knowledge of politics, they do suggest that traditional means of eliciting 
knowledge on surveys are likely biased downwards because they inhibit the use of relevant 
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of their declarative memory.   
Our findings suggest the importance of being careful when drawing broad conclusions about 
citizens￿ political abilities from the results of existing political knowledge tests. In addition to 
previously reported problems with the kinds of questions often used in knowledge assessments  
(Burton and Blair 1991, Gould 1996, Guthrie 1998, Lupia 2006, Tourangeau, et. al. 2000, 
Chapter 3.3), our experiment reveals that previous observations are also, in part, driven by 
attributes of the survey context that are quite unlike the contexts in which citizens make 
important political decisions. While such surveys do represent performance in environments that 
resemble surveys, we must be careful when generalizing those findings to dissimilar 
environments. By not allowing respondents to use the kinds of cognitive tools that they might 
use in real political circumstances, standard surveys systematically underestimate what citizens 
know at important political moments.  
Discussion: For Whom Do Time and Money Make the Largest and Smallest Difference? 
Previous studies have documented a correspondence between observed political knowledge 
and a range of personal and contextual factors. We take a moment to report on how our 
experimental manipulations affect these correspondences. Such analyses can confer two benefits. 
First, they provide evidence about the robustness of previous claims about the effects of factors 
such as education, income, race, gender, and interest in politics on political knowledge. Second, 
for people who seek to increase political knowledge through various kinds of motivational 
strategies (e.g., rallies, advertisements, or other forms of mobilization), such analyses may 
indicate the kinds of citizens who will be most and least responsive to civic education appeals 
whose success is premised on greater opportunity or motivation improving performance. To 
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Table 6. If the coefficients for a particular variable are significantly greater for some groups than 
others, we can conclude that our treatments change the effect of this variable on political 
knowledge. 
(Table 6 goes here) 
Table 6 shows that for most variables, offering greater time or money does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the relationship between the named factor and political 
knowledge. There are, however, important exceptions. Despite the relatively small sample size 
per condition, we find significant differences in the effects of several variables on political 
knowledge. 
Extra time significantly increases performance for respondents who are older and those who 
are college-educated. These results imply that traditional surveys are particularly likely to 
underestimate what such citizens know. These are also people who we expect may have broader 
stores of declarative or procedural knowledge on which they draw in circumstances that are more 
like important political moments and less like a traditional fast-paced survey. 
Also noteworthy is the fact that the experimental treatments actually close the performance 
gap between respondents who report being very interested in politics and those who report being 
less interested. We demonstrate this closing gap in two ways. First, notice that political interest 
has its largest effect in the ￿one minute with pay￿ condition. When respondents are motivated by 
the prospect of a small material reward for answering correctly, but have no opportunity to 
search for a correct answer, the politically interested among them do particularly well. The 
difference in performance between the moderately interested and the least interested is large and 
significant in the ￿one minute, pay￿ condition, but not in either of the conditions that grant 
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political interest. All else constant, respondents with low and moderate interest in politics use the 
extra time to close the gap in performance. 
To make these effects more transparent, figure 5 graphs the predicted values for each of the 
four conditions. We compare predicted political knowledge for a white male college graduate, 
with mean age and income, full-time employment, and Internet access. The dotted line illustrates 
that political interest has its largest impact in the ￿one minute with pay￿ condition. The 
difference between the least and most interested respondents corresponds to two items on the 
knowledge scale, a very large effect by comparisons to the effects of other variables. For the two 
￿24 hour￿ conditions, this difference is less than one item. This sizable difference suggests to us 
that politically interested respondents do well on knowledge tests because they have a lot of 
political information stored in the part of declarative memory that they can retrieve quickly. 
When we give people time to draw on their procedural memory, political interest is much less 
important because with sufficient time even the less interested are able to find answers to 
political questions. Moreover, the significant effect on performance for this group in the ￿one 
minute with pay￿ condition suggests that traditional political knowledge measures do not 
document what the most interested people know well ￿ as simply offering them a dollar per 
correct answer boosted their performance. This finding is evidence that traditional means do not 
motivate even the most interested citizens to try as hard as they can on political knowledge 
assessments.  
(Figure 5 and Table 7 go here) 
The other large effect in table 6 concerns race. In the control condition, we find the same 
racial difference that many previous studies of political knowledge have found: Minorities do 
  22significantly less well. The effect, in our analysis, is about three quarters of an item. In the two 
pay conditions, however, the minority effect is dramatically increased. Whites answer almost 
two more questions correctly than minorities. What happened? Examining the experimental 
effects separately by race in table 7 reveals that our treatments had less of an effect on the 
knowledge scores of non-whites. The monetary incentive is particularly ineffective. When non-
white subjects have only one minute to answer questions, paying them for correct responses 
decreases performance, while the effect of adding performance incentives in the 24-hour 
treatment is virtually zero. We are surprised by this finding. While we have found a number of 
viable explanations, they are not mutually exclusive, nor are we able to distinguish amongst them 
empirically.
11 The fact that the differences are so apparent in the multivariate analysis in table 6 
suggests that the race difference is not an artifact of income, education, or the other variables 
listed in that table.  We are interested in learning more about this difference in future studies.  
Conclusion 
Many observers are concerned about what citizens know about politics. Although many 
normative questions about the implications of political knowledge remain contested, there is a 
consensus that reliable measurements are socially valuable. This consensus rests on the premise 
that an informed population can make decisions that are more beneficial to themselves, their 
families, and the communities in which they live. Attempts to improve citizens￿ abilities to 
perform important political tasks depend on what they know, and social science￿s ability to help 
                                                 
11 One that seems particularly plausible follows from Steele and Aronson 1995. In a series of laboratory 
experiments, Steele and his colleagues showed that ￿Black participants expecting to take a difficult, 
ability-diagnostic test showed significantly greater cognitive activation of stereotypes about Blacks, 
greater cognitive concerns about their ability￿ (1995: 805) and that such concerns ￿can further undermine 
performance by undermining motivation and effort￿ (1995: 809). It may be that our offer to pay for 
correct answers raised the stakes for performing well and activated analogous inhibitory mechanisms. 
  23improve their performance depends on how well we can assess if they have the knowledge they 
have at critical democratic moments. 
Our motive is to improve the conceptualization and measurement of socially relevant forms 
of knowledge. Implicit in this approach is the idea that atypical aspects of the typical survey 
interview context lead to knowledge measures that are less relevant to questions of democratic 
competence than commonly presumed. Our critique of existing practice has two prongs. First, we 
claim that existing measures ignore procedural memory, even though citizens rely on it when 
making important political decisions. Second, we claim that existing measures make a false 
presumption about the availability of relevant declarative memories during a typical survey 
interview. To convert this critique into a constructive basis for improved understanding, we 
remove typical time restrictions on some respondents and offer a monetary incentive to others. 
These treatments increase the number of correct responses by 11 to 24 percent on average and 
also reduce the magnitude of error in erroneous responses. At a minimum, such results clarify 
how much it would take to induce respondents to approach political knowledge questions in a 
manner that improves their responses. The answer is ￿not much.￿ Allowing extra time or 
introducing a small financial incentive ($1 per correct answer) was sufficient to increase 
performance significantly.  
One may respond that, ￿Of course people do better if they can ask someone else,￿ but for us 
that is exactly the point. In many of the circumstances about which political scientists and other 
observers of politics care most, those who cannot instantly recall a particular fact can take a little 
more time to think about it, ask someone, or look up the answer. Traditional surveys, while 
having many virtues, prevent or inhibit exactly the kinds of search activities that are in fact 
strongly encouraged by people who want others to make more informed decisions. 
  24Another possible objection is that citizens are not very motivated to search their memories at 
key political moments. For the most realistic assessment of political knowledge, it would be 
necessary to encourage exactly as much searching as occurs at key political moments. The 
incentive has to be big enough to compensate for the lack of motivation created by the typical 
survey context, but not so big as to create unrealistic incentives to get it right. We admit that such 
a calibration of incentives is by no means straightforward. Citizens vary in the extent to which 
they are intrinsically motivated to answer survey questions under traditional conditions. A 
monetary incentive that induces one respondent to devote greater effort to answering knowledge 
questions may have no effect on another. Clearly, other forms of motivation could be used in the 
dollar￿s stead. We intend to investigate this calibration issue further in future work. 
Of course, we expect that some citizens could be induced to devote more effort to politics 
even if we offered substantially more time or money -- but our experiment suggests that 
performance-related ￿tipping points￿ are not difficult to reach for many people. So while low 
political knowledge scores are sometimes described as if they are a trait, or purely a function of 
ability, our results undermine such representations. For if political knowledge was purely a 
function of ability, we should not be able to reject the null hypothesis (as ability should be 
constant across all conditions by virtue of randomization). In other words, if people do not 
perform well on knowledge tests because they are stupid and unable to understand politics 
regardless of how we ask the questions, then the procedural variations we introduced should 
make no difference. The fact that both experimental factors have sizable effects illustrates that 
limited ability is not the only obstacle to answering conventional political knowledge questions 
correctly. 
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We expected that additional time to answer the knowledge questions and a monetary incentive 
for answering them correctly will lead some respondents to devote greater effort to answering the 
questions. Reading the question carefully and trying to come up with the right answer might not 
necessarily take respondents much longer than answering the question ￿of the top of the head.￿ 
Only if respondents ask friends or family members or look up the answers, should they take 
considerably longer than respondents in the control condition or respondents who were given 
only one minute per question. In short, while we did not necessarily expect huge differences in 
completion time, both experimental factors should increase interview time beyond that of the 
control group. 
To assess the validity of these expectations, we conducted a manipulation check. Respondents in 
all conditions could stop and later resume the interview in the parts that precede and follow the 
knowledge part. That is why even a few respondents in the ￿one minute￿ condition took several 
hours to finish the interview. A measure of interview length is only available for the entire 
interview, not for the knowledge portion alone. In order to use the total interview time as a 
meaningful manipulation check, we have to assume that the time respondents spent on the parts 
before and after the knowledge section is, in expectation, the same in all experimental 
conditions. We cannot include the 17 respondents who answered knowledge questions, but did 
not complete the last section of the interview. Knowledge Networks did not collect data on when 
they interrupted the interview. 
Our check reveals that giving people more time to answer the knowledge questions led some, but 
not all respondents to spend more time completing the survey. The average length of the 
interview (for interviews under one hour) is 14.6 minutes in the ￿24 hour no pay￿ condition and 
  2616.6 minutes in the ￿24 hour with pay￿ condition, compared to 11.9 minutes in the control 
condition. The effect of monetary incentives on interview time is less obvious. Regressing 
logged interview time on the two factors and their interaction yields a strong main effect for 
time, and smaller, non-significant effects for pay and the interaction. Depending on how the 
dependent variable is specified (logged, truncated, or recoded to reduce the influence of very 
long interview times), the interaction term increases to approach statistical significance. When 
the interaction term is omitted, the main effect for pay increases and becomes significant. We 
interpret these results as follows: Not surprisingly, giving people 24 hours to complete the 
interview leads them to take more time. (This is true even for interviews of less than an hour.) 
Monetary incentives also increase interview length. This effect kicks in even in the ￿one minute￿ 
condition, but is stronger in the ￿24 hour￿ conditions. 
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  29Table 1: Knowledge Questions 
Question ID  Question wording  Response options (Correct response in bold) 
Senate term  How long is the term of office for a U.S. Senator?  open-ended, correct: 6 
Reps in Senate  Of the 100 members of the U.S. Senate, how many are members 
of the Republican party? 
open-ended, correct: 51, accepted range: 51-59. This range 
reflects two key points: a Republican majority and its inability to 
prevent filibusters. 
Closeness in 
2000 
What was the outcome of the 2000 Presidential Election in the 
state in which you now live?  
 
[The correct answer depends on the respondent￿s residence.] 
•  Bush won by more than 5 percentage points 
•  Bush won by less than 5 percentage points 
•  Gore won by less than 5 percentage points 
•  Gore won by more than 5 percentage points 
Striving Readers  President Bush proposed a ￿Striving Readers initiative￿ to help 
high school students who are not reading as well as they should be 
for their age. What is the status of the Striving Readers program? 
•  The program was implemented in 2002 and has already led to a 
1.3% increase in functional literacy among high school students. 
•  President Bush has proposed to fund this program at $100 
million in his 2005 budget. 
•  President Bush proposed this program, but did not include any 
funding for it in his 2005 budget. 
•  The program started last year, but in his 2005 budget President 
Bush proposed to cut its funding by $200 million. 
Iraq authorization  In the key Senate vote on October 11, 2002, how many 
Democratic Senators voted to give President Bush the authority to 
attack Iraq? 
•  None of them 
•  Two Democratic senators 
•  About a quarter of all Democratic senators 
•  A majority of all Democrats in the Senate, but not all of them 
•  All Democratic senators 
Line-item veto  A line-item veto allows the president to sign a budget bill while 
cutting specific spending items and tax expenditures that he 
disapproves. The Supreme Court recently ruled one version of the 
line-item veto unconstitutional. Other versions of the line-item 
veto are less likely to be overruled by the court. Which of the 
following statements best describes the presidential candidates￿ 
positions on new versions of the line item veto? 
•  President Bush and Senator Kerry both oppose the line-item veto. 
•  President Bush supports a line-item veto, while Senator Kerry 
opposes it. 
•  Senator Kerry supports a line-item veto, while President Bush 
opposes it. 
•  President Bush and Senator Kerry both support a line-item 
veto. 
(Table continued on next page) 
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Al-Qaeda 
connection 
As you may know, a special government commission￿called the 
￿9/11 Commission,￿ investigated the circumstances surrounding 
the September 11 attacks and recently issued its final report. 
Which statement most accurately represents the Commission￿s 
conclusions about the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda? 
•  They had no connection at all 
•  A few al-Qaeda individuals visited Iraq or had contact with 
Iraqi officials 
•  Iraq gave substantial financial support to al-Qaeda, but was not 
involved in the September 11th attacks 
•  Iraq was directly involved in carrying out the September 11th 
attacks 
Taxes compared 
to Europe 
Compared with the citizens of Western European countries, do 
you think Americans pay a higher percentage of their income in 
taxes, a smaller percentage of their income in taxes, or about the 
same percentage of their income in taxes? 
•  A higher percentage 
•  A smaller percentage 
•  About the same percentage 
Unemployment 
rate 
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics counts a person as 
unemployed if they are not employed at any job and are looking 
for work. By this definition, what percentage of Americans was 
unemployed in August of 2004? 
•  around 11 percent 
•  around 9 percent 
•  around 7 percent 
•  around 5 percent 
•  around 3 percent 
Estate tax  There is a federal estate tax ￿ that is, a tax on the money people 
leave to others when they die. What percentage of Americans 
leaves enough money to others for the federal estate tax to kick in? 
•  About 95% of all Americans 
•  About 70% of all Americans 
•  About 50% of all Americans 
•  About 25% of all Americans 
•  Less than 5% of all Americans 
Uninsured 
Americans 
In August 2004, the United States Census Bureau reported an 
estimate of the number of Americans without health insurance. 
The Census Bureau classified people as uninsured if they were not 
covered by any type of health insurance at any time in 2003. By 
this definition, what percentage of Americans did not have health 
insurance in 2003? 
open-ended, correct: 15.6, accepted range: ±6 points 
(Table continued on next page) 
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Federal Debt  The outstanding public debt of the United States is the total 
amount of money owed by the federal government. Every year the 
government runs a deficit, the size of the public debt grows. Every 
year the government runs a surplus, the size of the public debt 
shrinks. In January of 2001, when President Bush took office, the 
outstanding public debt of the United States was approximately 
5.7 trillion dollars. Which of the following responses is closest to 
the outstanding public debt today? 
•  Less than 3.5 trillion dollars 
•  4.5 trillion dollars 
•  5.5 trillion dollars 
•  6.5 trillion dollars 
•  7.5 trillion dollars 
•  8.5 trillion dollars 
•  More than 9.5 trillion dollars 
Kerry tax 
proposal 
John Kerry says that he would eliminate the Bush tax cuts on 
families making how much money? 
•  Over 50,000 a year  
•  Over 100,000 a year 
•  Over 150,000 a year 
•  Over 200,000 a year 
•  Over 500,000 a year  
Poverty rate  In August 2004, the Census Bureau reported how many 
Americans live in poverty. The poverty threshold depends on the 
size of the household. For example, a person under age 65 is 
considered to live in poverty if his or her 2003 income was below 
$9,573 and a family of four is considered to live in poverty if its 
2003 income was below $18,810. By this definition, what 
percentage of Americans lived in poverty in 2003? 
open-ended, correct 12.5, accepted range: ±6 points 
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  Percent Correct  Statistical Significance 
  One Minute  24 Hours   
  No Pay  Pay  No Pay  Pay   
Senate term (OE)  33  35  39  37   
Reps in Senate (OE)  39  45  49  51  Time: p<.01 
Closeness  in  2000          46 54 50 60 Time:  p<.10, Pay: p<.01 
Striving Readers  15  12  17  21  Time ￿ Pay: p<.10 
Iraq  authorization          56 58 63 62 Time:  p<.10 
Line-item  veto          39 35 45 44 Time:  p<.05 
Al-Qaeda  connection            30 29 30 28
Taxes compared to Europe  41  43  52  52  Time: p<.01 
Unemployment rate             27 34 38 39 Time:  p<.01 
Estate tax             36 47 46 46 Time:  p<.01, Pay: p<.01, Time ￿ Pay: p<.05
Uninsured Americans (OE)  13  16  17  24  Time: p<.01, Pay: p<.01 
Federal  Debt            22 24 27 26
Kerry tax proposal  41  50  46  55  Time: p<.10, Pay: p<.01 
Poverty rate (OE)  18  23  26  28  Time: p<.05 
Mean Percent Correct  32.6  36.1  38.9  40.9   
  
Note: Significance tests are based on logit models regressing response on the two experimental factors and their interaction. If the interaction term 
in the initial logit model was not significant, the model is reestimated with only the two main effects. (OE) = Open-ended
  33Table 3: Experimental Effects on Average Absolute Error, by Question 
 
  Average Absolute Error  Change in Average Absolute Error  Statistical Significance 
 
One Minute 
No Pay 
One Minute 
Pay 
24 Hours 
No Pay 
24 Hours 
Pay   
Senate term (OE)  1.73  - 0%  - 8.7%  - 7.5%  Time: p<.05 
Reps in Senate (OE)  7.67  + 4.4%  - 19.9%  - 15.5%  Time: p<.05 
Unemployment rate  2.71  - 9.2%  - 15.9%  - 13.3%  Time: p<.05 
Estate tax  23.0  - 23%  - 18.3%  - 20.4%  Time: p<.05, Pay: p<.05, 
Time ￿ Pay: p<.10 
Uninsured Americans (OE)  25.9  + 1.9%  - 5.8%  - 13.5%  Time: p<.05 
Federal Debt  1.55  + 0.6%  - 9.7%  - 6.5%  Time: p<.10 
Kerry tax proposal  71.5  - 16.1%  - 10.3%  - 27.4%  Time: p<.10, Pay: p<.05 
Poverty rate (OE)  21.3  - 3.8%  - 3.3%  - 9.4%   
Mean Change in Error    - 5.7%  - 11.5%  - 14.2%   
 
Note: Average Absolute Error is the mean absolute deviation from the correct answer. If a respondent did not provide any answer, the response is 
imputed based on a uniform probability over the entire range of possible responses. We explain this procedure in the text. Significance tests are 
based on OLS models regressing respondents￿ absolute deviation from the correct answer on the two experimental factors and their interaction. If 
the interaction term in the initial logit model was not significant, the model is reestimated with only the two main effects. 
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  One Minute  24 Hours 
  No  Pay Pay No  Pay Pay 
Number of Correct Answers         
less than 2  28 %  21 %  18 %  15 % 
more than 8  10 %  15 %  16 %  19 % 
Mean  Correct  4.5 5.0 5.4 5.6 
Percent Increase over Control  + 11 % + 18 % + 24 % 
Standard  Deviation  2.78 2.95 2.95 3.10 
  35Table 5: Comparing Experimental Effects to Other Correlates of Political Knowledge 
 
  Political Knowledge Score (0-14) 
Pay Condition: $1 per correct answer  .50* 
(.24) 
.53** 
(.20) 
Time Condition: 24 hours  .81*** 
(.24) 
.78*** 
(.20) 
Pay X Time  -.22 
(.34) 
-.30 
(.29) 
Follows politics ￿some of the time￿   .55** 
(.19) 
Follows politics ￿most of the time￿   1.55*** 
(.20) 
High school degree only   .50* 
(.22) 
Some college   1.19*** 
(.24) 
College or graduate degree   1.83*** 
(.24) 
Female   -.57*** 
(.15) 
Age   .013** 
(.005) 
Racial/Ethnic Minority   -1.39*** 
(.18) 
Income (1-19)   .12*** 
(.02) 
Full-time employment   -.35* 
(.17) 
Internet access (other than WebTV)   .52** 
(.15) 
Constant  4.54*** 
(.17) 
1.54*** 
(.41) 
R
2 .02  .29 
N 1220  1220 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
  36Table 6: Comparing Experimental Effects to Other Correlates of Political Knowledge 
 
  One Minute  24 Hours 
  No  Pay Pay No  Pay Pay 
Follows politics ￿some of the time￿  -.01 
(.34) 
a 
1.43*** 
(.36) 
ab 
.76 
(.40) 
.05 
(.41) 
b 
Follows politics ￿most of the time￿  1.78*** 
(.37) 
2.24*** 
(.39) 
ab 
1.20** 
(.43) 
a 
1.01* 
(.44) 
b 
High school degree only  .16 
(.38) 
.54 
(.43) 
.64 
(.47) 
.44 
(.50) 
Some college  .42 
(.45) 
a 
.90* 
(.45) 
b 
.84 
(.51) 
c 
2.32*** 
(.56) 
abc 
College or graduate degree  1.69*** 
(.42) 
1.62** 
(.46) 
1.83*** 
(.49) 
2.14*** 
(.56) 
Female  -.41 
(.27) 
-.90** 
(.28) 
-.53 
(.32) 
-.40 
(.32) 
Age  -.008 
(.009) 
ac 
.001 
(.009) 
b 
.040** 
(.01) 
ab 
.023* 
(.01) 
c 
Racial/Ethnic Minority  -.76* 
(.33) 
ab 
-1.83*** 
(.34) 
a 
-1.06** 
(.37) 
c 
-1.96*** 
(.40) 
bc 
Income (1-19)  .17*** 
(.04) 
.11** 
(.04) 
.098* 
(.045) 
.12** 
(.05) 
Full-time employment  -.69* 
(.31) 
-.48 
(.30) 
-.15 
(.38) 
-.22 
(.35) 
Internet access (other than WebTV)  .40 
(.28) 
.51 
(.29) 
.38 
(.33) 
.41 
(.34) 
Constant  2.53*** 
(.72) 
2.69*** 
(.70) 
1.41 
(.93) 
2.19* 
(.85) 
R
2  .36 .38 .23 .28 
N  310 304 294 298 
 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
Note: For comparisons between columns, coefficients with common superscript letters are statistically 
different from each other at p < .10. 
 
  37Table 7: Experimental Effects for Whites and Non-Whites, Knowledge Scales  
 
  One Minute  24 Hours 
  No  Pay Pay No  Pay Pay 
White  Respondents  (N=941)      
  Mean Correct  4.7  5.6  5.7  6.0 
 Percent Increase over Control  + 17 % + 21 % + 27 % 
Other  Respondents  (N=279)      
  Mean Correct  3.9  3.3  4.2  4.2 
 Percent Increase over Control  - 13 % + 9 % + 8 % 
 
  38Figure 1: The Experiment 
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  39Figure 2: Knowledge of Kerry￿s Tax Proposal 
 
"John Kerry says that he would eliminate the Bush tax cuts on families 
making how much money?"
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  40Figure 3: Knowledge of Health Insurance Coverage 
 
 
 
Note: The red line marks the correct answer (15.6 percent). For analytic purposes, we accepted 
answers within the two blues lines (+/- 6 percent) as correct.
  41Figure 4: Number of Correct Responses, by Experimental Condition 
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Figure 5: Predicted Political Knowledge, by Condition and Political Interest 
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